Mitchell, John Papers on Microfilm, 1887-1989
Collection Number: 5502 mf

John Mitchell was born in Braidwood, Illinois on February 4, 1870, the son of Robert Mitchell, a Scotch-Irish immigrant, and Martha Halley. His mother died soon after he was born, and his father died when he was six. Reared by his father's third wife, Mitchell had little opportunity for schooling and spent much of his time helping his stepmother with "taking in" the neighborhood washing.

At the age of ten, Mitchell left home and went to work on a neighboring farm carrying water to the hired help. When he was twelve, he returned to Braidwood where he began to work in the mines as a trapper boy; although Illinois law required a miner to be thirteen, the law was not enforced at the time. As a trapper boy, Mitchell opened and closed the wooden doors that separated sections within the mines, an operation which controlled ventilation. From trapper boy, he was slowly promoted to become a mule driver, a miner's helper, and finally a full-fledged miner.

When he was sixteen, Mitchell went west and worked in the mines of Colorado, but in 1888 he returned to Illinois and found employment in Spring Valley. After a ten-month miners' strike in 1891, he left for New Mexico, but later returned to Spring Valley. In 1892, he married Catherine O'Rourke and soon settled down to the miner's daily routine. The panic of 1893 and a strike by the miners of Illinois in 1894 added to the usual struggles of a young couple, and when a new English mine superintendent fired all the Irish workers at Mitchell's mine following the strike, Mitchell found himself without a job.

Mitchell found work in another camp where William D. Ryan, an old friend from Braidwood, had previously worked. Ryan, now a railroad employee and secretary of the sub-district of northern Illinois for the United Mine Workers, selected Mitchell as secretary-treasurer of the sub-district, which in effect made Mitchell the financial officer for the UMW in the state of Illinois. At the same time, Mitchell was sent to the state capital at Springfield as a lobbyist for the miners' cause.

While lobbying on behalf of the Illinois UMW interests, Mitchell successfully used his influence to secure reform in the state's labor laws. Through his efforts, a weighing law, a child labor law, and an act establishing a two year apprenticeship for miners were passed. Legislation also was enacted exempting the miners and operators from anti-trust laws, thereby permitting the miners and operators to sit in joint convention and establish appropriate price scales.

In 1897, Mitchell became a member of the Illinois UMW State Executive Board, and Ryan became state secretary- treasurer. On July 4 of that year the national UMW declard its first successful strike, and following its conclusion in September, Mitchell chaired a joint meeting of operators and miners in northern Illinois.

In 1898, at the age of twenty-seven, Mitchell was sent as an Illinois delegate to the National UMW convention. The vice- presidential aspirants of that year considered this office a stepping stone to the presidency because they fully expected president Michael Ratchford to resign and accept a position ith the United States Industrial Commission. In this contest, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Illinois UMW leaders each sought the vice presidential spot for a member from their respective states. With the help of his friend Ryan, who by now was a member of the UMW National Executive Committee, Mitchell was elected to this office. Ratchford accepted the post with the United States Industrial Commission in September, 1898, and precipitated a heated controversy over whether Mitchell should be allowed to succeed to the presidency. In an effort to avoid a divisive struggle that an extraordinary convention in the fall of 1898 might entail, Mitchell was permitted to succeed Ratchford as acting president of the UMW.

The summer and fall of 1898 were troubled times for a union which urgently needed unity. West Virginia operators had not participated in the joint negotiations of 1898, and were expanding their markets into those states where operators had signed agreements with the UMW. Also, several operators in Illinois did not accept the agreement and imported black strikebreakers, which provoked violence. Riots in such areas as Pana, Illinois, on September 28, 1898, and the Virden massacre of October 12 of that year, indicated a general lack of unification of the UMW in Illinois.

As National UMW vice-president, John Mitchell sought to organize workers in West Virginia and to persuade the miners in Illinois to accept the agreement of the multi-state joint conference. As acting president, he sent organizers into Kansas, Iowa, Arkansas, Oklahoma and other fields.

In January, 1899, Mitchell was elected president of the national UMW in his own right and in the fall of the year he went to eastern Pennsylvania in an attempt to organize its anthracite fields. Working conditions in the Susquehanna and Schulykill valleys were desperate, characterized by low wages, long hours, company owned houses and stores, child labor, and a higher incidence of industrial accidents and deaths than in the bituminous fields. Racial, ethnic, and language differences separated the miners in the anthracite area.

The operators were controlled basically by seven coal-carrying railraods which in turn were controlled by JP Morgan and Cornelius Vanderbilt. After some success in the soft coal fields, Mitchell was tested in the anthracite region where unorganized laborers numbered more than the enitre membership of the UMW. Mitchell enlisted the aid of clergymen and worked to change the thinking of many who had opposed unions initially. After five months of organizing, he succeeded in attracting to the ranks of the UMW only ten thousand of the one hundred fifty thousand eligible miners.

Mitchell left the anthracite fields of Pennsylvania briefly to report his progress to the UMW national office and to participate in the 1899 bituminous joint conference which extracted a twenty percent wage increase. He returned to the anthracite fields in August, 1900, and called a convention in Scranton, Pennsylvania, of the three anthracite districts which formulated demands for a wage increase.

The anthracite miners had not received an advance in wages since 1880, and the UMW National Executive Board authorized Mitchell to call a strike in the entire anthracite field if the convention's demands were not met. The operators ignored his request for arbitration, and the UMW called for a strike to commence on September 17, 1900. Despite the low membership count, one hundred twelve thousand workers responded and conducted the strike with restraint.

Writing John Mitchell on September 5, 1900, Daniel J. Keefe, president of the International Longshoreman's Association, expresesd the hope that the UMW would see a satisfactory conclusion to the coming struggle. Mitchell replied the next day that the coal operators did not respond to his offer of arbitration and that he feared a strike would be declared. Telegrams were sent on the twelfth to Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Hudson, Lackawanna, Central of New Jersey, Reading, and Erie Railroads, notifying them of an imminent strike and again requesting arbitration. On the same day, a circular was sent out calling for a strike, the coal miners to cease work on the seventeenth if no settlement was reached. Samuel Gompers, on the thirteenth, proferred what support he could.

On the same day, the UMW issued a circular stating the rationale for the strike. The cost of living had increased by ten percent. Under these circumstances, lack of a wage increase was tantamount to a wage reduction. Despite Pennsylvania statutes specifying 2400 pounds as a legal ton of anthracite coal, the miners were compelled to load a company ton ranging from 2700 to 4000 pounds, and, in addition, their wages were docked up to 12 percent for any impurities therein. The car had to be topped out at 18 inches above the edge. Miners were forced to purchase their own powder at exorbitant rates, and, as a condition of employment, were required to ransact business in "pluck me" stores.

On the sixteenth, R.N. Mason, an Ohio mine inspector, expressed the view that the nation's attention was riveted upon the anthracite strike, and considered the endeavor the "greatest labor struggle in the history of nations." In a letter of the seventeenth to the Reverend John F. Power, Mitchell explained that the UMW struck only after all reasonable measures to bring about an honorable settlement were exhausted, and noted the personal attacks by an operator-controlled regional press. John Fahy, president of UMW District 9 (Shamokin, Pennsylvania), informed Mitchell that there was an overwhelming response to the strike call.

Beginning on the nineteenth, status reports on the strike were issued, which detailed the percentage of striking and working miners in the anthracite fields. They also noted at any given time whether the operators struck against were badly crippled, slightly crippled, or continuing to function. Companies noted are Lehigh Valley, Reading, Markle, Van Vickle, Pardee, Cross Creks, Morgans, and others. By this date, seventy-four percent of the anthracite miners were on strike.

On October 1, 1900, the Reading Company posted a ten percent increase. The collection includes copies of the October 1, 3, and 17 notices of the Reading Company, and an October 2 notice of the Lackawanna. On the 12th, a convention convened at Scranton, PA, for the purpose of deciding whether to accept the operators' offer. On the 13th, the convention agreed to the operators' offer of a ten percent advance, provided that the agreement would not expire until April 1, 1901, nd that the sliding scale would be abolished. On the 17th, the Reading Company and others gave their consent. Letters from Mitchell expressed his view that the strike was a weapon of the last resort. He hoped that ultimately the operators in the anthracite fields would emulate the practice of their bituminous confreres by engaging in joint interstate agreements with the UMW, thereby decreasing the possibility of strikes.

The election of 1900 was an important factor in the early settlement of the 1900 anthracite strike. Marcus Alonzo Hanna, a spokesman for big business and a staunch supporter of the Republican party, sougt to avoid the embarrassment of a labor-management conflict for President William McKinley. When the operators refused to meet with Mitchell, Hanna arranged a meeting with JP Morgan, a financier of the operators. On October 3, 1900, labor delegates in convention proposed a ten percent increase in wages, abolition of the sliding wage scale (i.e., a scale dependent upon market fluctuations), and the recognition of workers' grievance committees. The operators refused to acknowledge the convention, but in October 10, 1900, posted notices which implied acceptance of the terms. The workers declared victory, and on October 29, 1900, the strike ended officially. This date was later declared Mitchell Day by the miners because of the UMW president's role in the strike.

Despite his victory in the anthracite fields of Pennsylvania, John Mitchell was faced with opposition in the ranks. At the January, 1901, UMW national convention, he was confronted by Thomas Lewis, Patrick Dolan, and socialists and radicals within the union. Lewis, the national UMW vice-president, led whatever serious opposition there was to Mitchell, though to no avail.

At the same time, Mitchell found himself confronting the American Federation of Labor in the matter of a jurisdictional dispute. Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, rebuked the UMW and Mitchell for gathering into its ranks unskilled workers and skilled craftsmen from separate trades such as the engineers, pumpmen, firemen, carpenters, and blacksmiths who worked in and around the mines. Mitchell defended the practice as essential in that three percent of the workers who were skilled could throw the ninety-seven percent of the remaining miners out of work by striking. Gompers later conceded Mitchell's point, which resulted in the Scranton Declaration permitting the UMW exclusively to continue the practice.

The Strike of 1900 was but a skirmish compared to the anthracite coal strike of 1902. In that year, the miners perceived their conditions as so desperate that they were willing to sacrifice heavily to have their grievances properly rectified. The success of the miners in a struggle for better wages and working conditions depended on the ability of the UMW to organize the workers and to convince the operators to accept demands they adamantly opposed. This movement was personally directed by John Mitchell as president of the UMW and architect of the strategy for the miners.

The January convention of the UMW in Indianapolis authorized Mitchell to call, with the advice of the National Executive Board, a sectional or national suspension of work in the bituminous regions. This action was designed to assist him if he considered a nationwide strike necessary in order to organize the anthracite regions, where previously the operators had done nothing to recognize the legitimacy of the union. On February 13, 1902, Mitchell sent invitations to all the operators of mines in the anthracite regions to meet the following month to discuss wages and prices in a joint conference. Within a week, he received negative replies from every operator. Also, in February, he met with JP Morgan to secure his intervention as financier for the operators. This tactic had succeeded and resulted in a wage increase two years before, but this time Morgan told Mitchell that he must attempt to deal with the operators on his own.

On March 18, representatives of three union districts of the anthracite region met in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, to discuss demands to present when the current wage scale expired on April 1, 1902. The Shamokin Convention demaned an eight hour day, a twenty percent increase in wages, a rate of sixty cents per ton fixed at 2,240 pounds, and recognition by the operators of the union in a contractual agreement.

The Industrial Department of the National Civic Federation, on request of the miners, arranged a meeting between railroad presidents, who exercised control over the mine operators, and a miners' committee. This meeting was fruitless, but a strike was postponed for thirty days. On May 1, the National Civic Federation transmitted John Mitchell's offer of a five per cent increase or arbitration. The operators refused the increase or any settlement by arbitration. On May 13, an executive committee of miners ordered a temporary work stoppage and on May 15, at a convention of the three districts' representatives in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, the miners voted, despite Mitchell's opposition, to extend the strike. Mitchell urged the miners to act together and avoid violence.

Mitchell issued a call on June 18 for a special national convention to meet in Indianapolis on July 18. Sentiment among the bituminous mine leaders was strongly in favor of a national strike in sympathy with those striking in Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Mitchell opposed a sympathetic strike, asserting that they usually failed and that the workers who had union contracts should honor them as sacred. Also, he advised the workers that the striking miners would need financial assistance desperately during the strike, which could be provided only by assessing the other miners.

Mitchell then detailed to the special convention his plan for the best way to aid those in the three anthracite districts: the national treasury should contribute $50,000, all local treasuries should give what they could, and a one dollar assessment per member should be made. Further, all union officials earning above a certain amount should be assessed twenty-five percent of their salaries. Finally, an appeal to other unions and the general public for financial support was outlined.

By August and September, the effects of the strike were apparent in the major eastern cities; for example, the price of a ton of coal in New York City jumped from five to twenty dollars. With winter approaching and neither side acknowledging defeat, politicians and public opinion urged a settlement, the public having become more sympathetic to the strikers as their working conditions and the restraint of their strike conduct were publicized. In late September, a letter from George Baer, president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, implying a divine right of capitalists to dictate business terms, received widespread publicity that embarrassed the operators. On September 26 the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad demanded that its workers return to their posts or be fired.

On September 28, Pennsylvania Governor Stone pledged state troops to protect any miner who desired to return to work. The strike continued. On September 29, as Mitchell and the district leaders were discussing plans to propose public ownership of the mines, President Theodore Roosevelt announced his intention to take a personal hand in the crisis. The President sent telegrams to Mitchell and the operators requesting a meeting at the White House on October 3.

John Mitchell and the three district presidents met with Roosevelt, five mine operators including Baer, and three cabinet officials. President Roosevelt acknowledged no legal right or duty to intervene, but appealed to the men's patriotism to settle the strike. Mitchell acknowledged the gravity of the situation, but recounted that the offers to meet with the operators were rebuffed. He proposed that the union would accept as binding the decision of a presidential commission. This evidently suited the President.

After an adjournment to allow time for the operators to draw up a written response, George Baer read the statement. He outlined the President's duties "to restore majesty of the law." The operators refused conciliation and insisted that the President restore law and order. Roosevelt was infuriated by the operators. Later efforts by the President were rebuffed until the pressure of public opinion indicated that the next session of Congress might declare public ownership of the mines.

The operators knew that Roosevelt would not veto such legislation, but would eagerly welcome it. On October 13, J.P. Morgan went to the White House to announce that the operators would accept arbitration. The President appointed a commission of seven members agreeable to the operators and Mitchell. On October 20 and 21, the anthracite miners, after a debate, decided to return to work on October 23.

The report of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission was issued on March 21, 1903. After five months of testimony from 588 witnesses, including four days of intensive cross examination of John Mitchell by Wayne MacVeagh, counsel for the Pennsylvania Coal Company, the Commission formulated its decision. The miners were awarded a ten percent increase in wages, an eight-hour day for engineers and firemen and nine hours for other miners. The commission refused to compel union recognition, and, while denying the demand for a standard weight, it established a sliding scale with a procedure for determining the scale on the basis of market conditions. A permanent conciliation board, composed of one miner and one operator for each of the three anthracite districts, was established to settle grievances. Despite some glaring defects, the Commission's decision was acceptable to the UMW.

From March, 1903, to March, 1908, when Mitchell stepped down as UMW president, the union experienced a period of unsteady growth. Dues-paying membership fluctuated bteween 1904 and 1906 because workers on strike could not contribute while unemployed. The depression of 1903 pressured the union to accept a reduction in wages of five and one-half percent. In addition to widespread unemployment, strikes occurred when operators reduced wages further than the 1904 joint agreement reached with operators in Pennsylvania, Ohio, indiana, and Illinois. The disputes in the anthracite region of eastern Pennsylvania were governed by a conciliation board established in 1903; often these disputes were not settled to the satisfaction of union members, and Mitchell noted apathy and a decline in membership in that region. He toured the region during the summer of 1905, and the rolls increased from 34,000 to 80,000. In August he addressed 150,000 people at Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, with President Roosevelt on the platform. However, Mitchell foresaw imminent difficulties in eastern Pennsylvania as contracts were to expire in less than a year.

The annual January convention of mineworkers in 1906 set the strategy for a coming meeting with the operators. The three anthracite districts left the negotiating in the hands of a committee headed by Mitchell. A special convention formed ten demands for the upcoming joint interstate conference with the operators scheduled for February 2, 1906. At that meeting Patrick Dolan, president of district 5, voted against the instructions of his miners in favor of a resolution by the operators to extend the reduced wage scale for two years. He was the only labor leader to vote with the operators. The conference ended abruptly, with the operators clearly showing a stronger position against a divided union. This impasse was the most serious threat to the strength of the union since Mitchell had assumed office.

In the next attempt to reach a settlement, H.C. Perry, president of the Illinois miners, introduced a resolution authorizing national and district officials to make two year agreements with any operator willing to restore the 1903 scale. This resolution in effect repudiated the policy of the previous decade of uniting the labor unions in the central competitive field until all the operators signed an agreement. Thomas Lewis of Ohio opposed the policy of district settlements, as he realized that operators in Ohio would not restore the 1903 scale unless forced to by the entire regional conference. After thorough discussion, Mitchell endorsed the policy and the Perry resolution was adopted by vote. Although much bitterness accompanied this decision, it proved to be a modest victory for the unions. By mid-April, 1906, most operators of unionized fields had signed the 1903 scale agreement and by mid-July, the rest of the operators submitted.

During the January, 1907, convention, after Mitchell read his report concerning the previous year's activities, Vice President Lewis read a scathing criticism of the union's policies for 1906. Lewis charged that the opportunity for an industry wide strike during a period of relative prosperity had been missed by the union. He also charged that, without desirable concessions, the sectional contracts caused declining morale and membership. Although Lewis was rebuked and Mitchell's action was endorsed by a committee report, the controversy continued.

In April, 1907, Mitchell suffered an appendectomy from which he did not fully recover until June. Late that month he traveled west to Montana and Wyoming on UMW business. By October of that year, Mitchell was again in poor health, and as a result, announced that he would not stand for reelection. On March 19, 1908, he stepped down as president before an appreciative convention.

Mitchell accepted employment with the National Civic Federation in August, 1908. Organized in 1900, the Federation sought to study and debate issues affecting United States' foreign and domestic policy, to mobilize enlightened public opinion on these issues, and to secure appropriate legislation relating to the same. While affiliated with this group, Mitchell was chairman of its Trade Agreement Department. In this capacity, he hoped to be able to bring about a better understanding by employers of the aims and methods of trade unionism. While he considered the work worthwhile, he did confide to Samuel Gompers that it was a bit of a letdown after his UMW endeavors. Unfortunately for Mitchell, the National Civic Federation was unpopular with many militant labor leaders because its membership included bitter foes of unionism. The radical element within the UMW continuously sought to persuade Mitchell to resign his position; they succeeded in 1911 when the union passed a resolution that made it a matter of expulsion for any UMW member to belong to the National Civic Federation.

Between 1911 and 1915, Mitchell was involved in the activities of the National Child Labor Committee, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the American Association for Labor Legislation, New York Peace Society, National Committee on Prison Labor, Travelers' Aid Society, and the National Woman's Trade Union League. Also during this period he undertook extensive public speaking tours for the Lyceum and Chautauqua circuits and under the guidance of his own agent. In June, 1915, he was appointed by Governor Glynn as chairman of the New York State Industrial Commission, a post he held until his death in 1919. As chairman, Mitchell was frequently called on to investigate and arbitrate labor-management disputes. Mitchell's duties in this capacity included the prevention of violations of New York's labor laws and the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Law and the State Insurance Fund.

During World War I, Mitchell carried the additional burden of the chairmanship of the New York State Food Commission. The Commission kept an eye on food production, offering advice on how to increase production and how to save food for the war effort, as well as opposing food price gouging and profiteering. Simultaneously, Mitchell was president of the New York State Council of Farms and Markets, chairman of the Federal Food Board, and chairman of the Federal Milk Commission for the eastern states. His last public appearance was in Syracuse before the New York State Federation of labor in August, 1919.

In early August, 1919, Mitchell presided at a public hearing in the Rome brass and copper strike. After the bitterly contested hearing closed, he set out with friends on a vacation trip, but shortly after the trip began, he experienced a gall stone attack and returned to New York City for surgery. He died on September 9, 1919, following an operation at Post-Graduate Hospital. Funeral services were conducted at the Roman Catholic Cathedral of the Diocese of Scranton, Pennsylvania, at which city his remains were interred.

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John Mitchell Papers on Microfilm #5502 mf. Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, Cornell University Library.

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